Strategy selection and simulation of regional port integration based on evolutionary game theory

Disordered competition among sea ports has been jeopardizing the efforts to gain due economic advantage from their resource advantage. The hinterland regional government can be the driving force to solve the problem. This paper studies the way of improving economic benefits of ports through regional port integration. The cooperation-competition game between regional government and the ports in the process of port integration is analyzed from the angles of both port managements and the regional government. How to achieve healthy and steady development of the port cluster through the unification of port operation is explored. The game among three involved parties in the integration process is simulated with MATLAB. The simulation shows that the distribution coefficient and the strength of reward-punishment mechanism of government are most significant factors influencing the integration process and the efficiency of governmental regulatory. The stability analysis of the equilibrium points in tripartite game is analyzed and the strategies（1,1,1） and（1,1,0） is suggested for stability.