基于Stackelberg博弈的岸电推广研究——补贴与碳交易政策双参与

    Research on the promotion of shore power based on Stackelberg game model:dual participation of subsidy and carbon trading policies

    • 摘要: 在港口岸电背景下,研究不同政策对港航企业的影响,有利于提高岸电使用率、实现既定减排目标。为了探究政策对港航企业影响问题,构建港口主导、航运公司跟随的Stackelberg博弈模型,旨在解决岸电设备创新问题,增加创新补贴,并将补贴与碳交易政策结合,探讨其对港航企业的影响。运用逆向求解法进行求解,使用Matlab进行数值仿真。研究结果表明:在减排初期,补贴政策有利于创新水平提高,在岸电技术成熟后政府实施双参政策有利于督促港航业持续研发岸电技术进行减排降碳。为此,建议政府初期采取措施扩大市场规模、提高社会低碳意识、增加创新补贴力度以促进岸电使用率,待技术成熟后,通过调整补贴比例与碳价维持岸电的使用。

       

      Abstract: In the context of port shore power deployment,studying the impact of different policies on port and shipping enterprises is crucial for improving shore power utilization and achieving established emission reduction goals. To explore the policy effects on these enterprises,a Stackelberg game model was constructed with the port as the leader and shipping companies as the follower,incorporating innovation subsidies into the framework. This model aims to address innovation challenges in shore power equipment and examines the combined impact of subsidies and carbon trading policies on port and shipping enterprises. The model is solved using backward induction and numerically simulated via Matlab. The results indicate that in the early stages of emission reduction,subsidy policies help enhance innovation levels,while after the maturation of shore power technology,the implementation of dual policies involving both subsidies and carbon trading is more effective in motivating the industry to develop emission reduction technologies. Therefore,it is recommended that the government take measures to expand market scale,strengthen societal low-carbon awareness,and increase innovation subsidies in the early phase to promote shore power utilization. After the technology matures,the subsidy ratio and carbon price can be adjusted to sustain the utilization of shore power.

       

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