Abstract: To achieve carbon neutrality,governments and enterprises are accelerating the decarbonization process in the shipping industry. This paper focuses on the Low-Carbon Maritime Supply Chain（ LMSC）,considering both government policies and consumers’ green preferences. A two-stage Stackelberg game model between shipping companies and freight forwarders is developed to determine optimal pricing and carbon emission reduction strategies,while examining the impacts of carbon taxes,government subsidies,and consumers ’ green preferences on decision-making. The analysis yields three main findings: First,cooperation between freight forwarders and shipping companies maximizes overall profits for the LMSC; however,to achieve higher emission reduction levels,both parties should co-lead the supply chain. Second,government subsidies and enhanced low-carbon awareness produce dual effects: while they help reduce emissions and increase corporate profits,they may also raise TEU market prices for consumers under certain conditions. Third,although carbon taxes significantly improve the low-carbon performance of the LMSC,they reduce profits for all participants and increase TEU market prices.